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Abstract
Starting in June 2017, roaming within Europe will become free for
mobile phone users, as an enforcement of the European parliament. The
goal being to obtain a unified digital market: this seems at first sight
to largely benefit to users, who will not have to worry about their usage
abroad. We design in this paper a model analyzing the impact of free
roaming enforcement on users and ISPs’ pricing strategies, with respect
to paid roaming to verify this assumption. We particularly focus on the
strategies on transit payments between ISPs in different countries. We
highlight that scrutiny is required since, depending on parameters, con-
sumer surplus or subscription penetration are not necessarily maximized
if free roaming is enforced.
1 Introduction
In traditional mobile network charging plans, roaming in a foreign country im-
plies additional charges, typically volume based or cap based. But in October
2015 the European parliament has decided to forbid roaming charges, starting
June 15, 2017, in order to have a unified digital market1. Users then just need
to subscribe to a plan in their member state, determined as the place where
they spend most of their time. As a transitory phase, the roaming charges have
already been capped since April 2016.
This free roaming rule does seem attractive at first sight, with mobile users
not having to worry about their data consumption while travelling all over
Europe. But it may lead to negative effects that we wish to investigate here:
i) Despite being appealing, is there a risk to create a price increase by which
“poor” domestic-only users would pay for “rich” roaming users? ii) What is
the impact of free roaming on transit prices between ISPs in different countries,
and then on subscription prices? iii) Is it needed to regulate the way transit
1https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/new-rules-roaming-charges-and-open-internet
1
prices are decided, or can we leave it open to ISPs (through negotiation or a
non-cooperative game)?
In order to answer those questions, we design a model representing the re-
lations between ISPs in two different countries. Each ISP decides the flat rate
price for its domestic users and the transit price (for traffic from the ISP in the
foreign country) charged to the counterpart ISP. To make comparisons with the
case of paid roaming, we will also add the possibility of a volume-based fee for
roaming usage, charged to its own users for data consumption abroad.
The two cases, free and paid roaming will be analyzed thanks to non-
cooperative game theory [2, 6], since the decision of an ISP will impact the
output (the revenue) of the distant ISP from the transit fee and the number
of roamers. We will show that scrutiny is required since some a priori counter-
intuitive results come out. We will illustrate among other things that consumers
do not always benefit from free roaming: consumer surplus, representing the ag-
gregated net benefit from users, might even be larger with paid roaming.Due to
the effect of prices on subscription rates, free roaming might also lead to less
subscriptions.
To our knowledge, a very limited amount of research work exists on the
analysis of the enforcement of free roaming, and even on roaming in general.
We can cite [7], but it is rather focusing on national roaming of customers
and cooperation among operators. Recently, we have designed and analyzed
in [4] a model looking at a single ISP optimizing its pricing strategies, both
in case of paid and free roaming, and comparing them. Our model makes use
of the same representation of users’ preferences, but extends it in the sense
that it additionally investigates the impact of relations between ISPs in the
different countries based on the negotiated transit prices, which can influence
the domestic decisions and induce a new level of decisions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our
model of user preferences and operator revenues as well as the different levels
of decisions. In Section 3, we recall the results on users’ choices in terms of
subscription and data usage depending on prices, as obtained in [4]. Section 4
provides some theoretical results on the users’ pricing game between ISPs, while
Section 5 analyzes transit prices being decided either from a non-cooperative
game, through a negotiation (using the so-called Nash bargaining solution [6]),
or by a regulator in order to maximize consumer surplus. Section 6 then com-
pares the outcomes of the combinations of scenarios to determine what would be
the best strategy for all actors and discusses the UE parliament decision. Sec-
tion 7 particularly focuses on the impact of decisions on each individual of the
population for an arbitrarily chosen scenario. Finally, we conclude in Section 8.
2
2 Model
We consider two countries for simplicity, differentiated by indices 1 and 2, but
more countries could be considered as well. According to the rules/recommendations2,
citizens of a country have to subscribe to the/an ISP in their own country to
avoid an unfair competition due to different local constraints. We thus avoid
the possibility of a citizen of a given country subscribing in another and less
expensive country and consuming freely in its own country.
2.1 Users’ representation
In each Country i ∈ {1, 2}, users have heterogeneous willingness-to-pay values
(in monetary units per month) for a flat-rate domestic subscription; we denote
that value for a particular user by θi, and assume that the distribution of θi
over the market is known to the operator. The cumulative distribution function
of θi is denoted by Fi and will help us to represent two countries with different
GDP per capita, a situation for which free roaming could have a more important
impact. In all our numerical analysis, we will assume that θi is exponentially
distributed with rate λi. Then the smaller λi, the larger the average wealth.
There is a total mass (population) mi of potential users in Country i.
But users are not only interested in a domestic usage of their mobile phone,
as they can in addition be willing to consume data while traveling abroad (that
is, while roaming). Here too there is some heterogeneity in the willingness-
to-pay for data while roaming, but it is reasonable to assume a positive cor-
relation between the willingness-to-pay θi for the domestic data plan, and the
willingness-to-pay function (in terms of volume) for roaming data. Let us de-
note this willingness-to-pay for roaming data by rθi(x) for a consumed volume
x over a month. All over the paper, we are going to consider the commonly
adopted following form of rθi , see [1, 3]:
Assumption A For any value of θ, the function rθ is such that
rθ(x) =
{
θx− αx
2
2 if x ≤
θ
α
θ2
2α otherwise.
with α a fixed parameter. The marginal valuation function r′θ then has the simple
expression
r′θ(x) = [θ − αx]+
where [y]+ := max(y, 0).
This specific form verifies expected properties: for any value of θi, it is non-
negative, null at 0, non-decreasing, concave and bounded. Moreover, it verifies
that users with high willingness-to-pay θi for domestic usage are also willing to
2see again https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/
new-rules-roaming-charges-and-open-internet
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pay more for roaming data usage than users with low θi (the so-called “positive
correlation” mentioned above).
The ISP in Country i is charging a flat-rate pi to its subscribers for a domestic
usage. We will compare free and paid roaming, so let us define ci as the fixed
per-volume price for roaming data; free roaming will just mean ci = 0.
Given those notations, the net utility of a user with domestic willingness-to-
pay θi in Country i and consuming a volume vi(θi) of roaming data per month
(on average), is
Ui(θi) := θi − pi + rθi(vi(θi))− civi(θi), (1)
where θi−pi stands for the net utility for domestic usage and rθi(vi(θi))−civi(θi)
is the net utility for roaming. That form defines the behavior of any user,
subscribing if getting a non-negative net utility. Let
Di := {θi : Ui(θi) ≥ 0}
be the set of users θi subscribing to the offer of ISP i, meaning that its associated
demand–the mass of subscribers to ISP i–is
di := mi
∫
Di
dFi(θi).
2.2 ISPs’ revenues and Consumer Surplus
Each ISP i chooses its subscription price pi, and (in case of paid roaming) the
roaming volume-based price ci charged to users, but can also charge a transit
price ti to the counterpart ISP for the traffic from foreign users using its network.
There are thus three decision variables for each ISP. We here potentially consider
that an ISP may charge more its own users than what it has to pay itself for
roaming data, that is, ci can be larger than tj with j 6= i.
From those assumptions, the revenue (that is, the utility) that ISP i tries to
maximize is
Ri = dipi + (ci − tj)mi
∫
Di
vi(θi)dFi(θi) + timj
∫
Dj
vj(θj)dFj(θj). (2)
Another measure of interest, especially from a European regulator (the
BEREC) point of view seeking to maximize user welfare, is the consumer surplus
representing the aggregated net utility of users over all countries:
CS =
∑
i
mi
∫
[Ui(θi)]
+dFi(θi) =
∑
i
mi
∫
Di
Ui(θi)dFi(θi). (3)
2.3 Scenarios and hierarchy of decisions
Several scenarios can be considered for the decision of transit prices t1 and t2,
while prices charges to users are always chosen to maximize the ISPs’ revenues.
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In all cases, we will compare the free roaming situation where c1 = c2 = 0 with
the paid roaming.
The scenarios for the decision on the transit prices are the following:
1. t1 and t2 decided by a regulator to maximize the consumer surplus;
2. t1 and t2 decided as a Nash Bargaining solution [6] under the threat that
the regulator will choose of no agreement is found;
3. (t1, t2) a Nash equilibrium as the result of a non-cooperative game.
There is a natural order of decisions:
1. The transit price(s) ti ∀i are first decided according to one of the three
above possibilities;
2. Then prices are defined by the ISPs: pi ∀i, as well as the cis in case of
paid roaming;
3. Based on all those values users decide to subscribe or not, defining the
domains Di ∀i.
But decisions are taken anticipatively, meaning that decisions at a given level
will be made anticipating the decisions afterwards. The game is thus analyzed
by so-called backward induction [2].
We therefore first compute the domains Di over θi of users choosing to
subscribe in terms of all other parameters, then the ISP prices using those
Dis for any choice of tis, and then the tis using the anticipated (previously
computed) values.
3 User decisions
Since the form of the user utility function described in Subsection 2.1 is taken
from the literature, the derivations of user choices have already been studied.
Based on utility function (1), it has been shown in [4] in the context of a single
ISP and considering a single country, but the results remain valid for our model,
that
• Under Assumption A, by a simple derivation with respect to vi, the con-
sumed volume is for a user θi is v
∗
i (θi) =
[
θi−ci
αi
]+
, so the user subscribes
if and only if θ + (θ−c)
2
2α 1l{θ>c} > p.
• For any price pair (pi, ci) the users who subscribe are those with θi > θ̄i,
where
θ̄i = min
(
pi, ci − αi +
√
α2i + 2αi[pi − ci]+
)
, (4)
leading to
Di = (θ̄i,∞).
In words, users with valuations above the threshold θ̄i will subscribe.
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4 On the pricing game between ISPs
For fixed values of t1 and t2, what is the output of the pricing game between
ISPs? In their choice, ISPs anticipate the reaction of users, hence know the
values θ̄1 and θ̄2 for any profile of subscription (and roaming usage, if any)
prices.
We have a non-cooperative game because the revenue (2) of one ISP depends
on the prices of the other ISP through the demand for roaming data from this
other ISP. However, for free and paid roaming, we have the following result
which simplifies the analysis.
Proposition 1 The determination of revenue-optimizing prices (pi, ci) of ISPs
is independent of the pricing strategy (pj , cj) of the other ISP j.
Proof: It actually comes from the expression (2) for the revenue of ISP i. The
best response of ISP i is obtained by differentiating (2) with respect to pi and
ci (or just with respect to pi if ci = 0 in the case of free roaming). Revenue Ri
is made of three components:
• dipi which depends only on decision variables of ISP i;
• (ci − tj)mi
∫
Di
vi(θi)dFi(θi) which depends on ISP j only through tj , but
that is a constant at this level of the game;
• timj
∫
Dj
vj(θj)dFj(θj) which does not depend on (pi, ci), and therefore is
a constant for the optimization at this level of the game.
As a consequence, we get the proposition. 
For free roaming, we have the expression of revenue of ISP i
Ri = dipi − tjmi
∫
Di
vi(θi)dFi(θi) + timj
∫
Dj
vj(θj)dFj(θj). (5)
With exponential distributions for θ1 and θ2 and the expressions of θ̄1 and
θ̄2 given in previous section, it gives for free roaming
Ri = mie
−λiθ̄ipi −tj miαi
(
e−λiθ̄i θ̄i +
1
λi
e−λiθ̄i
)
+ti
mj
αj
(
e−λj θ̄j θ̄j +
1
λj
e−λj θ̄j
)
,
and, for paid roaming,
Ri = mie
−λiθ̄ipi −(ci − tj)miαi
(
e−λiθ̄i [θ̄i − ci]+ + e
−λici
λi
e−λi[θ̄i−ci]
+
)
+ti
mj
αj
(
e−λj θ̄j [θ̄j − cj ]+ + e
−λjcj
λj
e−λj [θ̄j−cj ]
+
)
.
Computing the revenue-maximizing prices analytically seems intractable,
but it can easily be done numerically. For example when α1 = α2 = 1, λ1 = 1,
λ2 = 1.5, m1 = 1, m2 = 2 and t1 = t2 = 0.1, we get as revenue-optimizing
prices (p1, c1) = (1, 1.1) and (p2, c2) = (0.67, 0.765).
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5 On the determination of transit prices
Again, we are going to consider as much as possible paid and free roaming
simultaneously, since free roaming can be summarized by taking c1 = c2 = 0.
5.1 Transit price decided by a regulator
As a first possibility, we can let a regulator (like BEREC, the European one)
decide the transit prices t1 and t2. A goal would be then to maximize the
consumer surplus
CS =
∑
i
mi
∫
Di
Ui(θi)dFi(θi)
=
∑
i
mi
∫
Di
(
θi − pi + ([θi − ci]+)2/(2αi)
)
dFi(θi).
For free roaming, it reduces to CS =
∑
imi
∫
Di
(
θi − pi + θ2i /(2αi)
)
dFi(θi).
Remark first that the expression of CS does not directly depend on the tis,
but it does through the chosen pis, which depend on the tis from the second
term in (2).
Through extensive computations, we have found in all our experiments that
CS is maximized at (t1 = 0, t2 = 0). We do not claim that it is always the case,
but it seems to happen, at least with our parameters. Remark to understand
what could drive to this result that a sufficient condition for CS to be maximized
at (t1 = 0, t2 = 0) would be that the pis and cis are non-decreasing with the tis
since Di then decreases. The increase of pi in terms of tj depends on the respec-
tive evolution of the derivatives (in terms of pi) of dipi and mi
∫
Di
vi(θi)dFi(θi),
but a proof or simple condition for seems hard to find and is out of the scope
of this paper.
5.2 Transit prices as a Nash bargaining solution
Another solution is to consider the so-called Nash bargaining solution [5], out-
put of a negotiation between ISPs: each ISP independently chooses a set of
acceptable transit prices, and if the intersection of those sets is non-empty, the
transit price is arbitrarily taken in the intersection. If ISPs do not agree with
this, a threat is executed. A reasonable threat here is to take zero transit prices
because if no agreement is found, the regulator can impose that no transit fee
be applied. This negotiation scheme has in general several equilibria, but in [5]
it is stated that the most likely outcome is the one maximizing the product
of the utilities minus the utility at the threat situation. Formally, if Ri(t1, t2)
is the revenue if ISP i where the roles of t1 and t2 are highlighted (with the
corresponding equilibrium subscription fees), then the Nash bargaining solution
(tB1 , t
B
2 ) is defined as:
(tB1 , t
B
2 ) ∈ arg max
(t1,t2)
(
R1(t1, t2)−R1(0, 0)
)(
R2(t1, t2)−R2(0, 0)
)
,
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Figure 1: Free-roaming ISP revenues for t1 = 0.1, with α1 = α2 = 1, λ1 = 1,
λ2 = 1.5, m1 = 1, m2 = 2. Subscription prices are set through a non-cooperative
game among ISPs.
with the constraint that both terms are non-negative, because otherwise the
ISPs prefer the no-transit-fee solution.
Again, during all our numerical investigations, the Nash bargaining solution
was also at (0, 0). The reason is that with combinations of (t1, t2) at least one
of the ISPs get a smaller revenue than when it is (0, 0). We can illustrate this in
Figure 1, where we plot for t1 = 0.1 the revenues in terms of t2 and the threat
values R1(0, 0), R2(0, 0), in the case of free roaming (that is, c1 = c2 = 0).
5.3 Transit prices from a game between ISPs
Finally, the couple (t1, t2) can be the output (a Nash equilibrium [6]) of a non-
cooperative game between ISPs, since the revenues depend on the transit price
of the other ISP. But similarly to the users’ pricing game, we have the following
result saying that even if there is a dependence of revenues, the best-response
transit price of an ISP does not depend on the strategy of the other ISP.
Proposition 2 The revenue-optimizing transit price ti of ISP i is independent
of the strategy tj of ISP j (even if its revenue is not).
Proof: First remark that in the proof of Proposition 1, pi (and ci if paid roaming
is considered), and therefore Di and di depend on tj but not on ti. Therefore,
examining the expression (2) we observe that
• dipi + (ci − tj)mi
∫
Di
vi(θi)dFi(θi) depends only on tj and not on ti;
• timj
∫
Dj
vj(θj)dFj(θj) is the component that depends on ti and not on tj
since Dj depends on ti and not tj .
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As a consequence, we get the proposition. 
6 Comparison and discussion
In this section, we compare the outputs of the various scenarios, with transit
prices chosen by the regulator, as a Nash bargaining solution or through a non-
cooperative game, each time for free and paid roaming.
As discussed above, transit prices chosen by the regulator or as a Nash
bargaining solution always give (t1, t2) = (0, 0) and are therefore merged into
one case.
In the first subsection, we discuss the output when varying λ1, the other
parameters being fixed. We also studied the variations in terms of other param-
eters but it did not provide any meaningful information; for example varying m1
did not bring any significant impact on the various considered metrics. In the
last subsection, we discuss for specific parameters the impact on each individual
θi of the various strategies: free or paid roaming, combined with transit prices
decided from a non-cooperative game or chosen as (0, 0).
6.1 Impact of wealth parameter λ1 in Country 1
Let us fix (arbitrarily) the other model parameters, to α1 = α2 = 1, m1 = 1,
m2 = 2 and λ2 = 1. We investigate the impact of λ1 for the different strategies
on CS in Figure 2, on pi in Figure 3, on ci (in the paid roaming cases) in
Figure 4, on transit prices in Figure 5, on revenues of ISPs in Figure 6, on the
thresholds θ̄i in Figure 7, and on the proportions to subscribe F̄i(θ̄i) in each
country in Figure 8.
Discussing the impact of the density of valuation in Country 1 on CS, we can
remark that the larger λ1, that is the smaller the valuations in distribution, then
the smaller the CS at equilibrium. The situation with null transit prices (that is,
decided by Nash bargaining or the regulator) and free roaming is (here) always
giving the largest CS among all possibilities, hence should be the preferred
situation for a regulator. Null transit prices always give a better CS that when
transit prices are decided through a non-cooperative game, be it with free or paid
roaming. Finally, focusing on paid and free roaming, when transit prices (t1, t2)
are chosen through a non-cooperative game, there is no clear better-performing
scheme, in terms of consumer surplus, between free and paid roaming. It means
that enforcing free roaming could actually be a false good idea depending on
how prices are decided if transit price decisions are let to ISPs.
Looking at prices, wealth (λ1) in a country does not impact the pricing
strategies (p2, c2) in the other country. We can see on Figure 3 that the smaller
λ1 is, i.e., the larger the number of users with high valuation is, the larger the
subscription price p1 and roaming prices c1 are, because users are more likely
to accept high prices. Also free roaming induces a higher price because ISP 1
cannot get more money based on volume. Moreover subscription prices with
free roaming are higher at Nash-equilibrium transit prices than with (0,0) to
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Figure 2: Consumer Surplus in terms of λ1, for free and paid roaming, with
different transit prices.
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Figure 3: Prices pi in terms of λ1, for free and paid roaming, and different
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Figure 4: Roaming charges ci in terms of λ1, for different transit prices.
compensate the transit cost, but quite surprisingly with paid roaming, they are
the same; actually, as illustrated on Figure 4, transit prices are compensated by
roaming charges.
The level of wealth in a country is illustrated in Figure 5, and as proved
earlier, to impact the transit price of the other country (because it can attract
more roaming money) but not the domestic transit prices. Interestingly also,
there is no strict dominance of transit prices between free and paid roaming:
when λ1 is small, i.e., users are wealthier, the transit price from the other country
is larger with paid roaming than with free roaming, but it is the opposite when
λ1 is large; this can probably be related to the increased roaming charge ci
which increases with wealth, inducing a possibility to increase the transit prices
(indeed, the two values are highly positively correlated).
Revenues in terms of λ1 are shown in Figure 6. They are decreasing with
wealth, which is coherent; only R2 is independent of the wealth in Country 1
when transit prices are (0, 0), for free or paid roaming. It is also interesting
to see that imposing null transit prices may lead to larger revenues for ISPs
with respect to prices defined through a game, the preference depending on the
level of wealth in the country(ies). But for a fixed strategy for the definition
of transit prices, ISP revenues seem always larger with paid roaming than with
free roaming.
Looking more closely at the evolution of subscription thresholds θ̄i in Fig-
ure 7, the wealth distribution in Country 1 still does not impact Country 2,
because prices are not impacted there. On the other hand, θ̄1 depends directly
on p1 (and c1), hence decreases with λ1, i.e., when users are less wealthy. For
the paid roaming cases, the curves with zero or Nash transit prices are super-
imposed: there is no dependence on the choice of (t1, t2).
Figure 8 displays the proportions of subscribers in the different cases; again
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Figure 9: Utility in terms of θ
wealth in a country does not impact subscriptions in the other country. Wealth
has no impact on the proportion in the case of paid roaming, which is actually
not true for free roaming (ex: the proportion of subscribers in Country 1 in
the free and regulated case is increasing as λ1 increases, because of the price
decrease). Paid roaming is actually more interesting if the proportion of sub-
scribers is what we are focusing on.
7 Users’ utility in terms of θ
We now fix the parameters to α1 = α2 = 1, m1 = 1, m2 = 2, λ2 = 1 and
λ1 = 2. We use the prices determined for the four strategies (free or paid
roaming, null transit prices or determined through a Nash equilibrium), and
display in Figure 9 the individual user utility as a function of θ1.
We can see that for a large θ1 the free options will always be preferred, which
is not true when θ1 is small. Hence the consumer surplus should depend on the
distribution of wealth, i.e., of θ1. The gap between the two options with transit
prices decided through a non-cooperative game shows why the paid option is
prefered in this case (given that a small θ1 is much more likely to occur). Also
we see why the consumer surplus is larger with the free option with transit
prices (0, 0).
8 Conclusions
We have provided in this paper a model describing the interactions of ISPs
in different countries, and subscription choices of users potentially subject to
roaming. The goal was to analyze whether or not the decision to impose free
roaming in EU in July 2017 is good for users –which is expected– and ISPs
–which is less expected–.
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We have illustrated some a priori counter-intuitive results: free roaming is
not necessarily better for users than paid roaming (in particular, if transit prices
are decided by ISPs through a non-cooperative game), and ISPs’ revenues are
not necessarily larger if defined by the ISPs themselves. It shows that scrutiny
is required before taking a decision.
This work can be extended in several ways. First, we may add competition
among ISPs in given countries, or different levels of competition to see if this does
bring an asymmetry in the relations. Also some of our results are obtained with
full generality while others, even if illustrative of the required scrutiny, are from
numerical investigations with specific functions; we would look to generalize
those observations.
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